One Acre Minimum Lot Size Requirement in Zoning Ordinance Held to be Unconstitutional by Editors,
[Vol. 106
COMMENT
ONE ACRE MINIMUM LOT SIZE REQUIREMENT IN
ZONING ORDINANCE HELD TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The growing movement of population from urban to suburban areas
poses difficult problems for the suburban community. The immediate
effect is an increased load on existing facilities and services.' As the influx
continues, the need for additional facilities and services develops. Thus,
new schools, roads and sewers will be required. More police and firemen
must be employed. Recreation areas must be developed. 2  Time will be
required to meet these needs and a certain amount of planning will be
essential if waste and inefficiency on the one hand or a breakdown of
municipal functions on the other are to be avoided. Unfortunately, new
housing does not increase the assessed value of the real estate upon which
it is situated sufficiently to yield the taxes necessary to offset the addi-
tional community expenses.3  The result is a rising local tax rate.4 And not
only must the older resident pay a higher tax bill, but he may also find
the way of life in his community changed in a manner not in keeping
with his expectations. 5
Faced with these pressures, it is not surprising that the community
resorts to zoning as a method of alleviating its problems,5a although the
1. See Isard & Coughlin, Municipal Costs and Revenues Resulting Frol Coln-
munity Growth Part 1 Residential Communities, 22 JOURNAL OF THE Am.RICAN IN-
STITUTE OP PLANNERS 122 (1956).
2. Ibid. "Caught in this choatic web of problems are most smaller communities,
particularly those peripheral to central cities. Their rapid expansion in the last decades
has forced them to provide new facilities such as streets and highways, sewerage treat-
ment plants, storm and sanitary sewers, and schools. In addition, they have been forced
to bear the burden of increased fire, police, health, welfare, and recreation services."
Ibid.
3. See Zimmer & Hawley, Home Owners and Attitude Toward Tax Increase, 22
JOURNAL Or THE AMERIcAN INSTITUTE Or PLANNERS 65 (1956).
4. Ibid.
5. See Bauer, Do Americans Hate Cities?, 23 JOURNAL Or1 THE AMERICAN INSTI-
TUTE Or1 PLANNERS 2 (1957). Of course, owners of large undeveloped tracts may find
that community growth greatly increases the value of their land and hence they may
be willing to undergo a change in community atmosphere. Owners of small residential
lots, on the other hand, may not only find the community change distasteful but may
also find that a nearby development of lower cost homes reduces the resale value of
their residences.
5a. In a building market favoring low cost housing, minimum acreage requirements
may retard growth in a community, but essentially such a restriction is not a timing
device, i.e., one which regulates the amount of growth which a community is to enjoy
in a given period. An example of a timing device is an ordinance permitting issuance of
only a certain number of building permits in a given period. Accordingly, minimum
acreage requirements cannot readily be justified on the ground that they enable the
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justification for its doing so may have to be distinguished from the motives
leading to its action. For example, it is doubtful that the mere fact that
growth leads to an increased tax rate justifies imposition of restrictions
upon the use of property.0 On the other hand, the fact that the com-
munity may have to build sewers, schools or roads hurriedly and hap-
hazardly if there is a lack of planning, and that growth,' if uncontrolled,
would affect adversely the legitimate interests of the residents of a com-
munity in having a healthful and safe place to live, may adequately support
an exercise of police power.7 Despite this necessary distinction, some
zoning ordinances are hastily drawn and ill considered, enacted mainly to
exclude rather than insure that growth is- orderly and planned.8  Others,
however, are based on careful studies of existing conditions in the com-
munity and the manner in which growth can best be accommodated.
Various types of restrictions may be incorporated in a zoning ordi-
nance. Among these are minimum cost requirements, minimum floor space
requirements and minimum lot size restrictions. Of these, minimum
cost and floor space requirements, with few exceptions, have been found
unreasonable by the courts. 9 Minimum lot size requirements have, on the
other hand, received widespread judicial approbation, although the number
of cases in which an acre or larger minimum has figured has not been
community to smooth out its growth curve, thereby permitting it to more readily adapt
to its increasing burdens. Whatever the justification of these restrictions, it must lie in
the direction of advantages to be gained from a regulation of ultimate population
density. "Municipal power to zone stems directly from state enabling acts. The
majority of the acts closely follow the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of the
Department of Commerce." Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68
H- v. L. REv. 1154, 1155-56 (1955).
6. See Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv.
1154-58 (1955) ; Note, 50 COLUm. L. Rzv. 202, 207 (1950). It is doubtful that most
communities and courts distinguish between community planning through zoning the
purpose and effect of which is to attempt to balance community growth with real estate
valuation so as to prevent an upward movement of taxes and that which is direct solely
towards rational land use and the provision of facilities in an orderly and efficient man-
ner. The two tend to merge together with a third interest, that of maintaining an
attractive community. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to attempt to do more
than point out that a court, faced with the problem of evaluating the constitutionality
of a zoning ordinance, must decide which of these purposes and effects it will regard
as proper.
7. See BLACK, PLANNING VOR TH SmALL AMERICAN Cn'Y 36, 37 (rev. ed. 1944).
"Zoning should be fitted to a community only after the most exhaustive study of that
community's individual requirements and potentialities." Id. at 36. See also GALLioN,
THP URBAN PATTrRN 240 (1950).
8. See Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Pronote the Public
Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949). The test should be that a zoning ordinance is
designed for the public interest in private property rather than for the selfish interests
of the individual owners. Id. at 472. A common thread running through those decisions
which hold zoning ordinances unconstitutional is that the ordinances seemed to be
motivated by a desire of the residents to remain exclusive. See Note, 50 COLUM. L.
R~v. 202, 214 (1950).
9. Senefsky v. Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943) ; Medin-
ger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1951). Contra, Lionshead Lake v. Wayne
Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
See Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L.
REv. 1051, 1059-61 (1953); Nolan & Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for
M1fininnon Space Requirements, 67 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1954) ; Haar, Wayne Town-
ship: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1954).
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great, and of these, three have found the particular restriction involved un-
constitutional. 10 The most recent of these "dissents" is Bilbar Constr. Co.
v. Board of Adjustment of Easttown Township,"- in which the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court found a one acre minimum to be unconstitutional
because "not reasonably and clearly necessary for the health, safety or
morals of that c6mmunity or its inhabitants." 12
Plaintiff construction company, owner of a fifty acre tract in defendant
suburban Philadelphia township, made application to construct a single
family dwelling on a lot measuring 21,000 square feet.13 In accordance
with the township zoning ordinance ' 4 which classified the district within
which the tract lies as "A" residential and imposed a one acre (43,560
square feet) minimum area requirement upon lots in the district,15 the
township zoning officer denied the application. The township board of
adjustment sustained the denial as did the county court of common pleas.' 6
In reversing on appeal, the state supreme court noted that the plaintiff's
tract is in a residential area, though the township is largely rural and
agricultural in nature.' 7  On land across the road from the tract, Tredyffrin
Township, adjoining Easttown Township, imposes an 18,000 square feet
minimum area requirement,' 8 and a small business district is four hundred
feet away.' 9 Without relating these facts to its result, the court concluded
that the one acre minimum would make it "financially impossible for the
vast majority of young married couples and for the people of medium
income to purchase or own a home in that district .. ," 20
10. See Haar, supra note 9, at 1058-59. For cases, see notes 11, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39,
41, 43 infra. See also Application of Davis, Legal Inteligencer, Nov. 14, 1957, p. 1,
col. 3; cf. Bogert v. Washington Township, 135 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957).
11. Civil No. 193, Sup. Ct. Pa., June 28, 1957.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id. at 1.
14. "Municipal power to zone stems directly from state enabling acts. The
majority of the acts closely follow the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of the
Department of Commerce." Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68
HARv. L. Ray. 1154, 1155-56 (1955). In Pennsylvania, townships of the second class
are authorized to regulate: ". . . the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the
density of population .... " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 67001 (Purdon 1957).
15. Required minimum lot areas for other districts are: "B" districts, 21,000 square
feet; "Cl" districts, 14,000 square feet; "C2" districts, 8,500 square feet; "D" districts,
5,000 square feet; "business" districts, no minimum. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Ad-
justment of Easttown Township, Civil No. 193, Sup. Ct. Pa., June 28, 1957, at 1.
16. Id. at 2.
17. Ibid.
18. See Brief for Appellees, p. 3, Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment of
Easttown Township, Civil ,No. 193, Sup. Ct. Pa., June 28, 1957, stating that at one
time land in Tredyffrin immediately to the north of plaintiff's lot was owned by plaint-
iff, and through the efforts of plaintiff, the minimum area restriction was down-zoned
from 30,000 square feet to 18,000 square feet.
19. "The lot for which the building permit is sought is about 400 feet by straight
line and 1300 feet by roads from a business district." Id. at 17.
20. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment of Easttown Township, Civil No.
193, Sup. Ct. Pa., June 28, 1957, at 9.
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Comprehensive zoning,21 in principle, is not violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment,22 but in each case restrictions
imposed by a zoning ordinance must bear a reasonable relation to the health,
morals, safety or welfare of the community or its inhabitants. Several
jurisdictions,24 including the District of Columbia, regard protection of
aesthetic values as a proper exercise of the police power. Pennsylvania,
however, apparently does not accept this position,2 6 and with regards to
zoning has stated that "neither aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of
property values or [sic] stabilization of economic values in a township are,
singly or combined, sufficient" to sustain a zoning ordinance.2 7  Prior to
the Easttown Township case, Pennsylvania had not ruled on the constitu-
tionality of a one acre minimum requirement, but had upheld half acre
and lesser restrictions, explicitly or impliedly.28  In other leading cases,
its supreme court has rejected a sliding scale minimum floor space require-
ment 29 and a set-back requirement regarded as discriminatory.30
Other jurisdictions which have ruled upon the constitutionality of
one acre or larger minimum area restrictions have generally sustained them,
though for a variety of reasons. 31 Massachusetts declared a one acre
requirement valid in a township of 1300 people situated twelve miles from
Boston,3" 2 though with a caveat that an ordinance exclusionary in purpose
would be unconstitutional. 3 New York has upheld a two acre minimum 
34
21. For a definition of a comprehensive zoning plan, see Kutcher v. Town Plan-
ning Comm'n, 138 Conn. 705, 88 A.2d 538 (1952); 8 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 25.79 (3d ed. 1950).
22. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. See White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 265, 134 Atl. 409, 411 (1926).
24. See Jacobsen v. Village of Wilmette, 403 Ill. 250, 85 N.E2d 753 (1949) ; State
ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
In Wulfshon v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 300, 150 N.E. 120, 123 (1925), the court stated
that aesthetic considerations influenced many courts to declare zoning ordinances con-
stitutional, even though these same courts based their decision on other grounds. See
also an advisory opinion by the highest Massachusett court, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass.
1955). For the role which aesthetics have played in California law, see Rodda, The
Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 So. CALIrI. L. Rrv.
149 (1954). For the argument that aesthetic values should be included as one of the
valid subjects of the police power, see Sayre, supra note 8.
25. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (dictum).
26. Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 226, 104 A2d 118, 122 (1954); White's Ap-
peal, 287 Pa. 259, 266, 134 Atl. 409, 412 (1926) ; accord, Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121, 128,
81 A.2d 533, 536 (1951). But see Kerr's Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 250, 144 Atl. 81, 83
(1928).
27. Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 226, 104 A.2d 118, 122 (1954).
28. Volpe Appeal, 384 Pa. 374, 121 A.2d 97 (1956); Elkins Park Improvement
Ass'n Zoning Case, 361 Pa. 322, 64 A.2d 783 (1949); Brosnan's Appeal, 330 Pa. 161,
198 AtI. 629 (1938).
29. Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954).
30. White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 At. 409 (1926).
31. By considering restrictions of one acre or larger together, it is not meant to
imply that all restrictions of one acre or more present the same problem of justification.
Obviously, the problem is one of degree, and the larger the restriction, in general the
more difficult it will be to justify.
32. Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
33. Id. at 565, 42 N.E.2d at 518.
34. Dillard v. Village of North Hills, 276 App. Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2d
Dep't 1950), reversing 195 Misc. 875, 91 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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and one of 40,000 square feet.35 The former decision rested in part on the
fact that the disputant of the constitutionality of the ordinance had already
made a sizeable profit from a sale of part of the land he had recently pur-
chased in the district, and was seeking to increase his profit on the re-
mainder through a down zoning3 6 The 40,000 square feet requirement
was sustained in a small village bounded on three sides by water, the court
taking note of the fact that there are inherent advantages in an attractive
residential area. 7 Missouri has declared a three acre restriction valid 38
and New Jersey one of five acres.8 9 The New Jersey decision can be par-
tially explained by the New Jersey Constitution which makes it obligatory
for courts to construe the constitutionality of zoning ordinances liberally
in favor of the municipality.40 On the other hand, Illinois has voided a
two and one-half acre requirement 41 on the ground, inter alia, that none of
the surrounding plots met the requirements of the zoning ordinance.42
And Michigan struck down a three acre minimum because the greater
part of the community was zoned for three acres while the next lower
classification was 10,000 square feet.4
Three interests emerge in a minimum acreage zoning case: those of
the landowner, of the community and its other inhabitants, and of the
non-residents of the community seeking to migrate to the locale." The
community in its zoning ordinance may be expected to give adequate pro-
tection to its own interest and those of its inhabitants, apart at least
from that of the landowner challenging the ordinance. The role of the
court must therefore be, within the framework of the police power dogma,
to insure that the minimum area requirement is not unreasonably detri-
mental to the interests of the challenging landowner and non-residents
of the community. The latter, who have had no voice in the enact-
ment of the ordinance and who will not be parties to an action testing its
constitutionality, must as a rule depend upon the landowner to adequately
represent their position. Ideally, the court would have at its disposal in
the making of its determination as to the reasonableness of the ordinance
35. Gignoux v. Village of King's Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
36. Dillard v. Village of North Hills, 276 App. Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2d
Dep't 1950), reversing 195 Misc. 875, 91 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
37. See Gignoux v. Village of King's Point, 199 Misc. 485, 491, 99 N.Y.S2d 280,
286 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
38. Flora Realty and Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771,
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952).
39. Fisher v. Bedminster, 21 N.J. Super. 81, 90 A.2d 757 (L. 1952).
40. Id. at 84, 90 A.2d at 759.
41. County of Du Page v. Halkier, 1 I1. 2d 491, 115 N.E.2d 635 (1953).
42. Id. at 495-96, 115 ,N.E.2d at 637-38.
43. Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 Mich. 331, 336-37, 45 N.W2d 306,
309 (1951).
44. "Cities are not surrounded by walls, [sic] they are each a part of their region
and each is obliged to plan the spaces within its boundaries as an integral part of the
plan for spaces outside its boundaries." GALLION, Tn URBAN PATTERN 235 (1950).
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a regional plan against which to measure the community plan.45 This plan
would, by its nature, have to take into account more than the local com-
munities' interests, and would permit all residents of the metropolitan area
to have some voice in its development. Since few such plans have been
adopted, however, the court will normally have to depend on the parties
to the controversy-the landowner and the township-to assist it in ful-
filling its role. Thus, the framers of the ordinance should come forward
to demonstrate with evidence the factual basis upon which the ordinance
is founded: the character of the neighborhood, the lay of the land, the
existing and proposed transportation and sewerage networks, the capacity
of the school system and the manner in which it will be augmented, the
level of police and fire protection and other municipal services, and the
relation which the proposed population density bears to each of these.46
They should be able to show that the community has not set aside an un-
reasonably large portion of its available land for the highest minimum
acreage requirement, but has made allowance for various densities, and
that in general it has provided for orderly growth rather than has effec-
tively blocked growth. In opposition, the landowner, on his own behalf
and on behalf of the non-residents of the community, may introduce evi-
dence tending to indicate that the plan adopted does not bear a reasonable
relation to these factors or was framed without consideration of them.
Assuming a carefully drawn plan, well conceived from the standpoint of
land use and community planning, rather than from the standpoint alone
of the effect that growth may have upon the community tax rate, the court
should not substitute its judgment for that of the collective judgment of the
residents of the community, although it would have arrived at a different
conclusion in their place.
4 7
In Easttovrn Township neither party introduced any substantial amount
of evidence. 48  Thus unaided, the court must decide what presumption of
constitutionality, if any, should attach to the ordinance. A suggested ap-
proach and the one the Pennsylvania court apparently adopted, is that
a presumption of constitutionality shall attach unless the ordinance is "ex-
clusionary" in effect, in which case the presumption shifts to one of un-
constitutionality.49 Since any minimum area requirement is to some extent
exclusionary, Such a finding in a particular case is at best one that the
45. See Haar, Lant Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. Rv. 515, 524 (1957); Haar,
Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HAv. L. REv. 1051,
1062 (1953).
46. See note 7 supra.
47. Silver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 381 Pa. 41, 112 A.2d 84 (1955); Gratton
v. Conte, 364 Pa. 578, 73 A.2d 381 (1950) ; Liggett's Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 139 Atl.
619 (1927) ; Kistler v. Swarthmore Borough, 134 Pa. Super. 287, 4 A.2d 244 (1939).
48. See Record, Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment of Easttown Town-
ship, Civil No. 193, Sup. Ct. Pa., June 28, 1957.
49. "If after investigating there is doubt as to whether the statute is enacted for
a recognized police object, or if, conceding its purpose, its exercise goes too far, it
then becomes the judicial duty to declare the given exercise of the police power in-
valid." White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 265, 134 Atl. 409, 411 (1926).
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restriction was unduly exclusionary.50 However, there may be facts of
which the court could take judicial notice which would serve as guides to
such a conclusion. For example, the court could notice the distance of
the community from the center of the metropolitan area, and the rate and
direction of population movements from that center. • These factors would
indicate roughly the rate of growth the community might expect apart
from any zoning restrictions. This, compared with the community's present
and planned density, would suggest the extent to which the community's
zoning would inhibit the natural rate of growth. As a guide to the
reasonableness of the inhibition, the court could then notice the densities and
zoning restrictions of neighboring communities. Thus, a markedly lower
planned density in the community in question in comparison with its
neighboring communities would raise an inference of exclusion. 51 As a
further suggestion the court could take notice of the average cost of a
home on the ground zoned, for example, one acre in the community in
question. If this cost would be prohibitive for all but a small percentage
of the population of the metropolitan area, this would further strengthen
the inference of exclusion.52  In the Easttown Township case, the court
regrettably reached its conclusion without an analysis of this sort, thus
providing no assistance to communities or landowners in future cases.
50. The court might wish to give blanket approval to all minimums of, for exam-
ple, less than half an acre as a matter of administrative expediency, for the chances
that such restrictions could not be justified are slight. It would then only consider the
"exclusionary" aspects of restrictions of a half acre or larger.
51. The converse, i.e., that if neighboring communities have adopted similar re-
strictions, that of the community in question is not exclusionary, does not follow. Fre-
.quently, neighboring communities will all adopt the same high restriction.
